Fast IDentity Online with Anonymous Credentials (FIDO-AC)

Web authentication is a critical component of today's Internet and the digital world we interact with. The FIDO2 protocol enables users to leverage common devices to easily authenticate to online services in both mobile and desktop environments following the passwordless authentication approach based on cryptography and biometric verification. However, there is little to no connection between the authentication process and users' attributes. More specifically, the FIDO protocol does not specify methods that could be used to combine trusted attributes with the FIDO authentication process generically and allows users to disclose them to the relying party arbitrarily. In essence, applications requiring attributes verification (e.g. age or expiry date of a driver's license, etc.) still rely on ad-hoc approaches, not satisfying the data minimization principle and not allowing the user to vet the disclosed data. A primary recent example is the data breach on Singtel Optus, one of the major telecommunications providers in Australia, where very personal and sensitive data (e.g. passport numbers) were leaked. This paper introduces FIDO-AC, a novel framework that combines the FIDO2 authentication process with the user's digital and non-shareable identity. We show how to instantiate this framework using off-the-shelf FIDO tokens and any electronic identity document, e.g., the ICAO biometric passport (ePassport). We demonstrate the practicality of our approach by evaluating a prototype implementation of the FIDO-AC system.Comment: to be published in the 32nd USENIX Security Symposium(USENIX 2023

FeIDo: Recoverable FIDO2 Tokens Using Electronic IDs (Extended Version)

Two-factor authentication (2FA) mitigates the security risks of passwords as sole authentication factor. FIDO2---the de facto standard for interoperable web authentication---leverages strong, hardware-backed second factors. However, practical challenges hinder wider FIDO2 user adoption for 2FA tokens, such as the extra costs ($20-$30 per token) or the risk of inaccessible accounts upon token loss/theft. To tackle the above challenges, we propose FeIDo, a virtual FIDO2 token that combines the security and interoperability of FIDO2 2FA authentication with the prevalence of existing eIDs (e.g., electronic passports). Our core idea is to derive FIDO2 credentials based on personally-identifying and verifiable attributes---name, date of birth, and place of birth---that we obtain from the user's eID. As these attributes do not change even for refreshed eID documents, the credentials "survive" token loss. Even though FeIDo operates on privacy-critical data, all personal data and resulting FIDO2 credentials stay unlinkable, are never leaked to third parties, and are securely managed in attestable hardware containers (e.g., SGX enclaves). In contrast to existing FIDO2 tokens, FeIDo can also derive and share verifiable meta attributes (anonymous credentials) with web services. These enable verified but pseudonymous user checks, e.g., for age verification (e.g., "is adult")

FeIDo: Recoverable FIDO2 Tokens Using Electronic IDs

Two-factor authentication (2FA) mitigates the security risks of passwords as sole authentication factor. FIDO2---the de facto standard for interoperable web authentication---leverages strong, hardware-backed second factors. However, practical challenges hinder wider FIDO2 user adoption for 2FA tokens, such as the extra costs ($20-$30 per token) or the risk of inaccessible accounts upon token loss/theft. To tackle the above challenges, we propose FeIDo, a virtual FIDO2 token that combines the security and interoperability of FIDO2 2FA authentication with the prevalence of existing eIDs (e.g., electronic passports). Our core idea is to derive FIDO2 credentials based on personally-identifying and verifiable attributes---name, date of birth, and place of birth---that we obtain from the user's eID. As these attributes do not change even for refreshed eID documents, the credentials "survive" token loss. Even though FeIDo operates on privacy-critical data, all personal data and resulting FIDO2 credentials stay unlinkable, are never leaked to third parties, and are securely managed in attestable hardware containers (e.g., SGX enclaves). In contrast to existing FIDO2 tokens, FeIDo can also derive and share verifiable meta attributes (anonymous credentials) with web services. These enable verified but pseudonymous user checks, e.g., for age verification (e.g., "is adult")

Large scale multifactorial likelihood quantitative analysis of BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants: An ENIGMA resource to support clinical variant classification

The multifactorial likelihood analysis method has demonstrated utility for quantitative assessment of variant pathogenicity for multiple cancer syndrome genes. Independent data types currently incorporated in the model for assessing BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants include clinically calibrated prior probability of pathogenicity based on variant location and bioinformatic prediction of variant effect, co-segregation, family cancer history profile, co-occurrence with a pathogenic variant in the same gene, breast tumor pathology, and case-control information. Research and clinical data for multifactorial likelihood analysis were collated for 1,395 BRCA1/2 predominantly intronic and missense variants, enabling classification based on posterior probability of pathogenicity for 734 variants: 447 variants were classified as (likely) benign, and 94 as (likely) pathogenic; and 248 classifications were new or considerably altered relative to ClinVar submissions. Classifications were compared with information not yet included in the likelihood model, and evidence strengths aligned to those recommended for ACMG/AMP classification codes. Altered mRNA splicing or function relative to known nonpathogenic variant controls were moderately to strongly predictive of variant pathogenicity. Variant absence in population datasets provided supporting evidence for variant pathogenicity. These findings have direct relevance for BRCA1 and BRCA2 variant evaluation, and justify the need for gene-specific calibration of evidence types used for variant classification

Large scale multifactorial likelihood quantitative analysis of BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants: An ENIGMA resource to support clinical variant classification

Abstract The multifactorial likelihood analysis method has demonstrated utility for quantitative assessment of variant pathogenicity for multiple cancer syndrome genes. Independent data types currently incorporated in the model for assessing BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants include clinically calibrated prior probability of pathogenicity based on variant location and bioinformatic prediction of variant effect, co-segregation, family cancer history profile, co-occurrence with a pathogenic variant in the same gene, breast tumor pathology, and case-control information. Research and clinical data for multifactorial likelihood analysis were collated for 1395 BRCA1/2 predominantly intronic and missense variants, enabling classification based on posterior probability of pathogenicity for 734 variants: 447 variants were classified as (likely) benign, and 94 as (likely) pathogenic; 248 classifications were new or considerably altered relative to ClinVar submissions. Classifications were compared to information not yet included in the likelihood model, and evidence strengths aligned to those recommended for ACMG/AMP classification codes. Altered mRNA splicing or function relative to known non-pathogenic variant controls were moderately to strongly predictive of variant pathogenicity. Variant absence in population datasets provided supporting evidence for variant pathogenicity. These findings have direct relevance for BRCA1 and BRCA2 variant evaluation, and justify the need for gene-specific calibration of evidence types used for variant classification. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.Peer reviewe

Where Brain, Body and World Collide

The production cross section of electrons from semileptonic decays of beauty hadrons was measured at mid-rapidity (|y| < 0.8) in the transverse momentum range 1 < pt < 8 Gev/c with the ALICE experiment at the CERN LHC in pp collisions at a center of mass energy sqrt{s} = 7 TeV using an integrated luminosity of 2.2 nb^{-1}. Electrons from beauty hadron decays were selected based on the displacement of the decay vertex from the collision vertex. A perturbative QCD calculation agrees with the measurement within uncertainties. The data were extrapolated to the full phase space to determine the total cross section for the production of beauty quark-antiquark pairs